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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
has only the requirement of satisfying a "reasonable man" test.12 The Court here
holds that the goods shipped must "actually match" the sample. Thus the seller
might satisfy the legal requirements with lower quality than expected in the
sample, and in the same instance breach the agreement by supplying better than
expected in the delivery of the bulk.
Statute Of Frauds - Contract Not To Be Performbd Within One Year
In Zupan v. Blumberg,13 the Court of Appeals unanimously held, reversing
the Supreme Court' 4 and the Appellate Division,15 that an oral agreement whereby
a free lance advertising solicitor was to receive a stated commission on any account
which he procured for as long as it was active, was void under the Statute of
Frauds since it could not be performed within one year.'6 The plaintiff sued for
commissions on orders which he claimed were placed with the defendant by a
customer whom he had procurred even though the orders were placed more than
one year after the oral contract was made.
As a general rule a contract for services must be in writing if it is for an
indefinite duration.' 7 If the terms of the contract include an event which could
terminate the contractual relationship within one year, the mere possibility that
the parties' liabilities will endure beyond that time wi not bring the contract
within the Statute of Frauds.1
8
The lower courts and the respondent felt that this case did not come within
the general rule but that it was akin to Nat Nal Service Station v. Wolf.'9 In that
case the Court held that since neither party was obligated to do anything, there
was just a continuing offer to contract and not a contract which would last for an
indefinite duration.
However, in the instant case, plaintiff's right to his commission depended
solely on the account, which he procured for the defendant, remaining active.
It was not necessary for him to do anything further.
Therefore it could not be said that there was a continuing offer to contract
within the meaning of the Nat Nal Servico Station case for by the terms of the
contract the plaintiff had fulfilled aU of his obligations and the defendant was
12. See note 1 supra.
13. 2 N.Y.2d 547, 161 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1957).
14. 142 N.Y.S.2d 702 41955).
15. 1 A.D.2d 203, 148 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1st Dep't 1956).
16. N.Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAw §31.
17. Choen v. Bartgis Bros. Co., 264 App. Div. 260, 35 N.Y.S.2d 206 aff'd 289
N.Y. 846, 47 N.E.2d 443 (1943).
18. Martocci v. Greater New York Brewery, 301 N.Y. 57, 92 N.E.2d 887
(1950).
19. 304 N.Y. 332, 107 N.E.2d 473 (1952).
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obligated to pay him his commission, as long as the procured customer did
business with the defendant. Clearly then this was not a contract which could be
performed within a year and the Court properly held it to be within the statute.
Inferprefafion Of Escalafor Clause
Bethlehem Steel Company v. Turner Construction Company20 involved the
interpretation of the meaning of words used in the price-adjusting (escalator)
clause of a construction sub-contract. The Court proceeded on the theory that
construction of contract terms is a matter of law where the language is plain and
unambiguous. 21 Plaintiff, Bethlehem Company, agreed to furnish, erect and paint all
structural steel work in a building which general contractor Turner Company was
building for Mutual Company, the owner. While the contract in which the disputed
clause appears was made by plaintiff with Turner Company that company was
acting for Mutual and it is Mutual that is hereinafter referred to as defendant.
The escalator clause provided:
The price or prices herein stated are based on prices for com-
ponent materials, labor rates applicable to the fabrication and erection
thereof and freight rates, in effect as of the date of this proposal. If, at
any time prior to completion of performance of the work to be per-
formed hereunder, any of said material prices, labor rates and/or freight
rates shall be increased or decreased, then in respect of any of said work
performed thereafter there shall be a corresponding increase or decrease
in prices stated.""
The dispute arose over the meaning of "component materials."
Part of the formula for computing changes in the contract price was based
on the labor rates for fabricating and erecting the component materials, but
made no mention of labor rates along the steel production line. Use of the word
"thereof" in the above quoted clause indicated that the clause in its entirety related
to the erection job and not to the manufacture of steel. Taking the language of
the clause as a whole, the Court held, as a matter of law, that the intent of the
parties was that "component materials" should mean steel products like bars
and sheets that are used in the structural steel framework of a building.
Generally, the purpose of a price-adjusting clause is to protect against
unanticipated or unpredictable changes in price which might render the bargain
unduly harsh. However, in the instant case, the $10 per ton increase in the price
of steel products seems to have been already in effect and known to both parties
20. 2 N.Y.2d 456, 161 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1957).
21. Accord, Brainard v. New York Central Ry., 242 N.Y. 125, 133, 151
N.E. 152 (1926).
22. See note 20 supra at 460, 161 N.Y.S.2d at 94.
